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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

impracticability of taxing small transfers. It surely is not overlooked
that a gift of a future interest can be as small as any other gift. And
there is no hint of a legislative desire to penalize gifts simply because
enjoyment is postponed. Possibly it is forgotten that there are legitimate, intelligent and practical reasons for restricting a donee's immediate use and possession of property. This is especially true if the
donee is a minor.
It is not here proposed that the statutory provision should be
eliminated entirely. The exclusion should be denied to gifts where
the number of donees, or eventual donees, and the value of their
gifts actually are uncertain. But the provision as it now stands is
irrationally discriminatory. A possible solution would be to allow the
exclusion even though the gift is of a future interest as long as the
number of donees and the value of their gifts are definite and certain.
It is doubted that this would provoke excessive litigation.
Robert A. Layden

RECENT DECISIONS
ADOPTION -

INHERITANCE

FROm FIRST ADOPTIVE PARENTS BY

CHILD SUBSEQUENTLY ADOPTED BY OTHERS. - In re Zaepel's Estate,
• . .Cal. . . ., 228 P. (2d) 600 (1951). The petitioner attempted to

contest the disposition of property under the will of the testatrix who,
at one time, had adopted the petitioner. The decedent and the father
of the petitioner were married after he divorced her natural mother.
This adoption was accomplished under the laws of Connecticut. Several
years after this proceeding she was adopted by her natural grandmother in New York. After the death of the petitioner's father, the
second wife moved to California and remarried. By her will, duly
probated, she left her estate to the Roman Catholic Church of St.
Helen in Los Angeles. In the will she recited that she had no children.
The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court which had
decided that the petitioner was neither a descendant nor an ancestor
who, under the will or the laws of succession, was entitled to take the
property bequeathed or devised in the will.
Of the many problems arising with respect to adoption, one involves
the capacity and right of inheritance from and by the adopted child.
Occasionally there has arisen, as here, the question of inheritance from
the first adoptive parents by a child subsequently adopted by others.
The majority of decisions favor inheritance by the adoptee from
the first adopters. Among this majority, however, there is a well-
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marked separation between cases in which the first adopters die prior
to the second adoption proceedings, and cases where the first adopting
parents are still living at the time of the subsequent proceedings. In
the first instance, the inheritance is considered to have vested in the
adoptee at the death of the original adopters. In Pattersonv. Browning,
146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993, (1896), the court found no reason why an
adopted child should not inherit from its natural parents, and also
from its adoptive parents. Consequently, it saw no reason why an
adoptee might not inherit from both first and second adoptive parents.
In a decision considered to be under the minority rule, In re Talley's
Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P. (2d) 495 (1941), the court agreed
in part with the first group of majority cases by declaring that the
adopted person inherits from the first adoptive parents, who died
before the second adoption, because the inheritance occurs at the
instant of death and the estate vests at that time. Patterson v. Browning, supra; Russell's Adm'r v. Russell's Guardian, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 236
(1892); In re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925).
In the second group of majority cases the inheritance is upheld
even though the death of the first adopters does not antecede the
second adoption. The rationale is that most adoption statutes do not
cut off 'the right to inherit from natural parents, and, analagously,
therefore, the right to inherit from adopting parents is not cut off.
The argument is succinctly stated in Dreyer v. S6hrick, 105 Kan. 495,
185 Pac. 30 (1919), where the court observed that in the absence of a
statute preventing dual inheritance it could not be said that the
adoption statute cut off capacity to inherit already enjoyed, and that
there was no reason why a second adoption should annihilate the right
of inheritance when the first adoption had no such result. Accord:
Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246, 178 N.W. 406 (1920); Villier v. Watson,
168 Ky. 631, 182 S.W. 869 (1916); In re Egley's Estate, 16 Wash. (2d)
681, 134 P. (2d) 943 (1943). In Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294,
209 S.W. (2d) 859 (1948), the Tennessee court supported both
majority views, but the case should probably be distinguished because
the issue was whether an attempted annulment of the original adoption
proceedings was effective or whether the attempted annulment had the
effect of a re-adoption by a natural parent.
The minority decisions oppose inheritance from first adoptive
parents by an adoptee who has been adopted by others. This view
distinguishes between a birth right and a right acquired by grace of
statute, and on this basis, it is argued, the right of inheritance is
severed. As it was explained by a Michigan court, In re Klapp's Estate,
197 Mich. 615, 164 N.W. 381 (1917), after the second adoption,
• . . the first adoptive father was no longer entitled to the custody of
the child; neither was he entitled to its services. He was no longer obligated to care for, educate, and support the child. If the new adoption
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destroyed -these rights and obligations, why did it not destroy the child's
right to inherit, since that right was dependent for its existence upon
the same assent, the same agreement, which created the other relations?

The question can be, and has been, raised as to how, in the case
of a child, a minor may assent to the terms of an agreement of which
he has no knowledge. To skirt this difficulty one court, In re Talley's
Estate, supra, emphasized the element of blood relationship by stating,
at 109 P. (2d) 498:
Neither in theory, practice nor common sense was petitioner the
adopted son of his first adoptive parents after his second adoption. Having
lost that relationship (a thing which by parallel he could not entirely do,
at least as to blood, as to his natural parent) there was no longer any
predicate upon which -to base the conclusion that he would thereafter
inherit from his first adoptive parents the same as if he had been their
natural son.

If the better law lies with the minority, as has been suggested,
Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession by and from the Adopted Child, 28
WASH. U. L. Q. 221 (1943), 16 NOTRE DAm_
LAW. 240 (1941), 18
WASH. L. REV. 215 (1943), perhaps it should be left to legislatures
to formulate desired public policy as it was in the principal case. In
that case, both trial and appellate courts invoked CAL. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 257 (1944) which bars an adopted person from succession to
the estate of a natural parent since the relationship between them
has been severed by the adoption.
According to Kuhlmann, supra, only five states have enacted specific provisions cutting off inheritance from natural parents by a child
who is subsequently adopted by others. Of these five, two, California
and Connecticut, are represented in the cited case. Michigan which
pioneered the minority rule still adheres to its decision, but raises
the inference that it might now rule otherwise had not the earlier
decision hardened into a rule of property law of more than thirty
year's standing. In re Carpenter'sEstate, 327 Mich. 195, 41 N.W. (2d)
349 (1950). Judging by these few developments over three score years,
it does not appear that any marked change will take place in the
present status of the question until the problem becomes more extensive or more acute.
John M. Sullivan

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -

CONTINGENT FEES -

QUANTUM MERUIT.

- McCarthy v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A. (2d) 240 (1951).
The plaintiff, an attorney, entered into a contingent fee contract with
defendant, his client. The contract provided that the plaintiff would
take one-third of the alimony decreed by the court contingent upon
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securing a divorce for the defendant. The plaintiff made a reasonable
effort to secure a reconciliation and performed other legal services for
the defendant. Defendant discontinued the plaintiff's services six
months after the divorce action was brought, and plaintiff brought this
action to recover the reasonable value of his services. The Connecticut
court held that a contract to accept a contingent fee in divorce actions
is void as against public policy, and that every reason for denying
recovery upon the express agreement applies equally to the denial
of recovery on quantum meruit.
When an attorney and client enter into an illegal fee arrangement
to obtain a divorce, should the court allow a recovery on quantum
meruit? This was the issue involved in the instant case.
In England and Massachusetts contingent fee contracts are illegal
in all cases. Sherwin Williams Co. v. J. Mannos & Sons, Inc., 287 Mass.
304, 191 N. E. 438 (1934); Wild v. Simpson, [1919] 2 K. B. 544
(C.A.); Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 H. & N. 890, 157 Eng. Rep. 1436
(1860). This rule evolved from the theory that reconciliation and a
minimum of litigation were essential to a well-ordered society. The
courts foresaw the danger of bringing suit where little or no cause
existed. It was felt that contingent fee contracts were an incentive
to the attorney to pursue the case without making a reasonable effort
either to effect a reconciliation or to avoid litigation. Radin, Contingent
Fees in California,28 CALiF. L. R v. 587, 588 (1940).
Most jurisdictions permit contingent fee contracts save where
divorce is involved on the ground that poor and indigent clients would
have no other way of securing adequate legal assistance. Dorr v. Camden, 55 W. Va. 226, 46 S. E. 1014 (1904). But since the husband is
held accountable for the reasonable value of the services performed
by an attorney in behalf of his spouse, there is no validity for extending
this argument to divorce actions. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1216 (Burns
1933); People ex rel. Mehan v. Mehan, 198 Ill. App. 300 (1916);
Radin, supra at 589.
In this country the general rule is that a contract for the payment
of a fee to an attorney, conditioned upon his procuring a divorce
for his client or contingent upon the amount of alimony obtained, is
void as against public policy. Brindley v. Brindley, 121 Ala. 429, 25
So. 751 (1899); McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S. W. 931
(1911); Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900); Barngrover v. Pettigrew, 128 Iowa 533, 104 N. W. 904 (1905); Jordan v.
Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N. W. 826 (1886); Klampe v. Klampe,
137 Minn. 227, 163 N. W. 295 (1917); Lynde v. Lynde, 64 N. J. Eq.
736, 52 At. 694 (1902).
It is also a general rule in the United States that where the services
to be performed are not illegal, but the contingent fee contract entered
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into is illegal, the attorney is allowed recovery on quantum meruit. McCurdy v. Dillon, 135 Mich. 678, 98 N. W. 746 (1904); Overstreet v.
Barr, 255 Ky. 82, 72 S. W. (2d) 1014 (1934); Ferkin v. Board of
Education, 278 N. Y. 263, 15 N. E. (2d) 799 (1938). Although many
states have adopted this rule, they still hold that it is the attorney's
duty to attempt a reconciliation. Recognizing that the state has an
interest in maintaining the family relation, Johnson v. Johnson, 245
Ala. 145, 16 So. (2d) 401 (1944); Seacord v. Seacord, 33 Del. (3
Harr.) 485, 139 At. 80 (1927); Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289,
118 S. E. 316 (1923); Hahn v. Hahn, 104 Wash. 227, 176 Pac. 3
(1918); Miles v. Chilton, 1 Rob. Eccl. 684, 163 Eng. Rep. 1178
(1849), the state's interest is not served by permitting recovery on
quantum meruit where a contingent fee contract has first been made
for the purpose of securing a divorce. Brindley v. Brindley, supra.
Although an Iowa court, In re Sylvester's Estate, 195 Iowa 1329,
192 N. W. 442, 443-4 (1923), stated the above principles, it failed to
follow them to the logical conclusion, that recovery should not be
allowed on quantum meruit:
A contract between an attorney and client, providing for the payment
of a fee to the attorney contingent upon the procurement of a divorce for
the client, is against public policy and illegal and void. Such a situation
involves the personal interest of the attorney in preventing a reconciliation
between the parties, a thing which the law favors and public policy
encourages. . . . The sanctity of the marriage relation, the welfare of
children, the good order of society, the regard for virtue, all of which the
law seeks to foster and protect are ample reasons why such contract
should be held to be contrary to public policy.
The minority rule, which the Connecticut court followed in deciding
the instant case, holds that where the court discovers during the
progress of the divorce action that it is being prosecuted on a contingent
fee, no attorney fee will be allowed. Brindley v. Brindley, supra; White
v. White, 86 Cal. 212, 24 Pac. 1030 (1890); Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal.
1, 16 Pac. 345 (1888). When consideration is given to the ill effects
incident to the majority rule and the resultant temptation to forego
reconciliation, the virtue of the minority rule is apparent. There is a
direct conflict between the interests of the state in the family relation
and the majority rule.
It is the opinion of the writer that the same reason for disallowing
recovery upon the illegal contingent fee contract, should apply with
equal force to a recovery on quantum meruit. The stability of the state
depends on the unity of the family. The attorney has a duty to press
for a reconciliation. It would seem that the courts have a greater duty
to set down rules which would require the attorney to exercise his duty.

William G. Greif

RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS -

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF STATE STATUTE

ASSERTING IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESMENT CORPORATION DOING SINGLE ACT IN STATE OF FoRum. - Smyth v. Twin

State Improvement Corp..Vt..... , 80 A. (2d) 664 (1951). This
was a tort action brought by Lucy Smyth, a resident of Vermont,
against the Twin State Improvement Corporation, a Massachusetts
corporation. The facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint show that the
defendant, in repairing the plaintiff's house, located in Vermont, negligently placed holes in the roof and in the sides of the building, causing
water to leak through with resultant damage. Service was had on the
foreign corporation under VT. REv. STAT. § 1562 (1947), by serving
the Vermont Secretary of State and by sending a copy to the defendant's principal place of business in Massachusetts by registered mail.
The defendant appeared specially and moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the complaint did not show the commission of a tort as required
by VT. REv. STAT. § 1562 (1947) and that the statute is unconstitutional. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to allege
the necessary jurisdictional facts.
On plaintiff's appeal the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the
lower court on the issue of the adequacy of the pleadings, and went
on to hold that the provisions of VT. Rxv. STAT. § 1562 (1947) were
not in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By this decision, the State of Vermont asserted in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on a cause of action arising out
of a single, isolated activity performed by the corporation within the
state and where the activity represented the only business transacted
there.
The Vermont statute leaves no room for doubt that the present case
is included within its terms. VT. REv. STAT. § 1562 (1947) reads:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Vermont
to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if

such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont
against a resident of Vermont, such acts shall be deemed to be doing
business in Vermont by such foreign corporation . . . in any actions or
proceedings against such foreign corporation arising from or growing

out of such contract or tort.
The precise question involved - whether a single, isolated activity of
a foreign corporation renders it amenable to personal jurisdiction for
liability arising from that activity in the courts of the state where the
act was done - has not as yet been decided by the United States
Supreme Court. But from an analysis of the case law on the subject,
the principle is drawn that in order for a foreign corporation to be
subjected to an in personam judgment, the foreign corporation must be
"doing business" in the state of the forum. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486 (1913);
Old Wayne Mutual Life Association of Indianapolis v. McDonough,
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204 U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236, 51 L. Ed. 345 (1907). But this merely leads
to the question whether a single, isolated activity can constitute "doing
business."
The federal courts in particular have refused to establish any
definite test to determine what constitutes "doing business," basing
their reluctance on the proposition that each case is to be determined
on its own facts. Bergold v. Commercial Nat. Underwriters Inc., 61 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Kan. 1945). In general, ". . . the business must be
of such nature and character as to warrant the inference that the
corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction. . . ." People's
Tobacco Company v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 S. Ct.
233, 235, 62 L. Ed. 587 (1918). Applying this standard, the courts
have concluded that a single, isolated activity by a foreign corporation
does not constitute "doing business" as will render it subject to in
personam jurisdiction. Bank of America v. Whitney Central National
Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. Ed. 594 (1923); Rosenberg
Bros. & Company v. Curtis Brown Company, 260 U.S. 516, 43 S. Ct.
170, 67 L. Ed. 372 (1923). In order to establish this jurisdiction, there
must be continuous dealings of some type. International Harvester
Company of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L.
Ed. 1479 (1914); Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. Ed. 569 (1899). The
continuous dealings which have justified in personam judgments against
foreign corporations have been varied: the continuous solicitation of
orders by agents with authority to take payment, International Harvester Company of America v. Kentucky, supra; the ownership of the
stock of a domestic corporation with the added factor of control of the
domestic corporation, Bergold v. Commercial Nat. Underwriters Inc.,
supra; the issuance of insurance policies together with the sending of
agents to adjust claims, Commercial Mutual Accident Company v.
Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 29 S.Ct. 445, 53 L. Ed. 782 (1909); Pennsylvania
Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407,
25 S. Ct. 483, 49 L. Ed. 810 (1905); the maintenance by a railway
company of an office with a freight agent there to settle claims in a
state where the railway has no trackage, St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
v. Alexander, supra; or the maintenance of an office with an agent
therein selling securities, Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S.
623, 55 S.Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed. 1097 (1935).
The recent case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), though authority only
for the proposition that continuous solicitation by salesmen of a foreign
corporation constitutes "doing business" in the state of the forum, is
better known for its broad tests to determine what activities of a
foreign corporation will establish personal jurisdiction. Required are
sufficient contacts with the state of the forum so ". . . that the
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maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" 326 U.S. at 316. This dictum, together
with others of the same import from the same case, is the foundation
upon which the Vermont court rendered its decision in the present case.
The authoritative weight of this dicta remains to be determined.
It is interesting to note the judicial construction given a state statute
similar to VT. REv. STAT. § 1562 (1947). Arkansas in 1947 enacted
a statute, Am. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 340 (1947), which provided for
in personam jurisdiction over ".

. any corporation not qualified under

the Constitution, and Laws of this State as to doing business herein,
who shall do any business or perform any characterof work or service
in this State...." [Emphasis supplied.] Provision was made, as in the
Vermont statute, supra, for service upon the Secretary of State and for
sending a copy by registered mail to the defendant at his last known
address. A case arising in the federal courts under this act held that
it must have been the legislative intent ".
that it apply only when
the foreign corporation is 'doing business' (as that expression has
been defined by court decisions) in the State of Arkansas." McWhorter
v. Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437, 439 (W. D. Ark. 1947). The
opinion implies, 72 F. Supp. at 439, that if "any business," or "any
character of work or service," as used in the act, is intended to apply
to a single, isolated activity, the statute would be declared unconstitutional as violative of due process. The following year, the Arkansas
Supreme Court declared, though in a statement not necessary to the
disposition of the case before it, that this part of the act was "a valid
exercise of the legislative authority," Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark.
1010, 214 S.W. (2d) 212, 214 (1948), without placing upon it the
construction adopted by the federal court.
Perhaps the only true examples of a foreign corporation being
subjected to in personam jurisdiction on liability arising from single,
isolated activity are to be found in the inclusion of the foreign corporation within the scope of the non-resident motorist statutes, as a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. Highway Steel & Mfg. Co. v.
Kincannon, 198 Ark. 134, 127 S.W. (2d) 816, appeal dismissed, 308
U.S. 504, 60 S. Ct. 88, 84 L. Ed. 431, rehearingdenied, 308 U.S. 635,
60 S.Ct. 134, 84 L. Ed. 528 (1939); Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20
N. E. (2d) 592 (1939). Another example, although it stands alone,
sanctions in personam jurisdiction in an action for the unpaid part
of the purchase price on a contract of sale of machinery entered into
in the state of the forum. Colorado Iron-Works v. Sierra Grande Min.
Co., 15 Colo. 499, 25 Pac. 325 (1890).
The merit in holding a foreign corporation personally liable for
the consequences of its activities within the state, even though the
activity is single or isolated, is obvious. Leflar, Acts Of 1947 General
Assembly, Acts 65 and 347; Service On Non-Resident Defendants, I
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ARK. LAW REv. 201 (1946-47). But this is not the law as established

by the decided cases. The cases referred to by the Vermont Supreme
Court to ".

.

. illustrate the proposition that continuous activity within

the state is not necessary as a prerequisite to jurisdiction," 80 A. (2d)
at 666, are concerned, not with foreign corporations, but with individuals, and have arisen under non-resident motorist statutes. There is,
then, no real authority to sustain the position taken by the principal
case; there is only the dicta of the International Shoe case, supra.
Though modern mobility may favor the progress and the development
in the law which this Vermont decision represents, nevertheless, the
constitutional requirements of due process of law, as established by an
almost unbroken line of judicial decisions, cannot be disregarded. Until
the dicta of the International Shoe case, supra, is given authoritative
standing as law, and until this prospective "law" is established as
applicable to single, isolated activity similar to that in the instant case
- a determination which was expressly avoided even in the dicta of
the InternationalShoe case, supra - the instant decision must be held
to represent a departure from the traditional requirements of due
process.
Joseph F. MacKrell

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SEPARATION OF CHURcH AND STATE RELEASED TIME PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC ScHooLs. - Zorach v. Clauson,

303 N. Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951). The petitioners, both
mothers of public school children, instituted a mandamus proceeding
to compel the Board of Education of the City of New York and the
Commissioner of Education of the State of New York to abolish
the "released time" program in the public schools of New York City.
Under this program parents were allowed to withdraw their children
from school for one hour each week in order to send them to religion
classes. It was contended by the petitioners that the "released time"
program was a direct violation of the First Amendment which was
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. In support of their
contention the petitioners relied primarily on the principles set forth
in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203,
68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
The court ruled that the "released time" program as operated in
New York City was not violative of the Constitution within the
principles set forth in the McCollum decision, differentiating the two
cases on their facts.
The McCollum decision was based to a large extent on a statement
made in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504,
91 L. Ed. 711 (1947), by Justice Black:
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Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid allreligions, or prefer
one religion over another.... In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and State."

State courts have differed widely in their decisions regarding separation of Church and State. Some of the courts have held that the
transportation of children in public school busses to parochial schools
was not permissible. Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N. Y. 200, 15
N.E. (2d) 576 (1938); Visser et ux. v. Nooksack Valley School Dist.
No. 506, 33 Wash. (2d) 699, 207 P. (2d) 198 (1949). The following
permitted this transportation: Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. (2d) 653,
167 P. (2d) 256 (1946); Adams v. County Commissioners, 180 Md.
550, 26 A. (2d) 377 (1942); Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md.
,314,199 At. 628 (1938). Zellers v. Huff, -..N.M .....
, 236 P. (2d)
949 (1951), and O'Conner v. Hendrick, School Trustee, 184 N. Y.
421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906), held the wearing of religious garb by
teachers in public schools to be objectionable. But in Gerhardt v. Heid,
66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936), and in Hysong v. School Dist. of
Gallitzin Borough, 164 Pa. 629, 30 Atl. 482 (1894), it was held
unobjectionable. The reading of the Bible in public schools has
been allowed. Kaplan v. Independent School Dist. of Virginia, 171
Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927); Doremus v. Board of Education, 5
N. J. 435, 75 A. (2d) 880 (1950). In People ex rel. Ring v. Board of
Education of Dist. 24, 245 IlM. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910), and in State
ex rel. Weiss v. District Board of School-Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 44
N.W. 967 (1890), the reading of the Bible was not allowed.
The New York courts were first faced with the problem of the constitutionality of a "released time" program in Stein v. Brown, Board of
Education, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N. Y. Supp. 822 (Sup. Ct. 1925). There
it was held that the board's practice permitting pupils to leave early
to attend religious classes was unlawful and unauthorized because it
substituted religious instruction for the required public school curriculum. In addition, the court held that the printing of registration and
attendance cards for the religious program on school presses was an
unauthorized use of public funds in aid of religious institutions. A few
years later the New York Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Lewis v.
Graves, State Commissioner of Education, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 N.E.
663 (1927), ruled that the "released time" program as administered
in the city of White Plains was not an unconstitutional use of public
property or money inaid of denominational schools. The program was
the same as that which was declared unconstitutional in the Stein case
except that the cards were not printed by the schools. The court stated
that the requirements of regular attendance were elastic and absences
were excusable for any legitimate reason within the discretion of the
authorities.
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In Gordon v. Board of Education, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 464, 178 P.
(2d) 488 (1947), the California court followed the liberal trend by
declaring "released time" programs constitutional since they do no violence to the doctrine of separation of Church and State. The Supreme
Court of Illinois likewise held a "released time" program constitutional
in People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.
(2d) 161 (1947), but on appeal the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the "released time" program was unconstitutional.
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra. This first and
only case on "released time" decided by the Supreme Court has caused
a furor.
After the McCollum decision, the courts of New York continued to
declare the "released time" programs constitutional, contending that
the cases could be distinguished on their facts from the McCollum case.
The constitutionality of the programs was upheld in Lewis v. Spaulding,
193 Misc. 66, 85 N. Y. S. (2d) 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948), and in the present
case.
Whether all "released time" programs are unconstitutional per se
is a question not answered satisfactorily in the McCollum decision.
There was no definite statement that a certain feature, if found in a
"released time" program, would render it unconstitutional. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring specially in the McCollum case, suggested that
a plan other than the one there involved might not be subject to
objections. He stated, 333 U. S. at 231:
We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before
us which, though colloquially characterized as "released time," present
situations differing in aspects that may well be constitutionally crucial ...
[Plrograms . . . like that before us, could not withstand the test of the
Constitution; others may be found unexceptioliable.

On the other hand, Justice Reed, who alone dissented in the McCollum case, stated that although various expressions in the majority
opinions apparently allowed for further litigation variations from the
plan actually involved, nevertheless any future cases would have to
run the gauntlet not only of the judgment which was entered but of
the accompanying words of the opinions. 333 U. S. at 239-40. He could
not determine from the majority opinions whether the purpose of the
plan for religious instruction during public school hours was unconstitutional or whether some ingredient used in or omitted from the formula
made the plan unconstitutional. However, he stated, 333 U. S. at 240:
From the tenor of the opinions I conclude. . . that any use of a
pupil's school time, whether that use is on or off the school grounds,
with the necessary school regulations to facilitate attendance, falls under

the ban.
In predicting whether or not the principal case will be reversed by
the Supreme Court, it is well to note that in the McCollum case the
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"released time" program involved (1) the use of tax-supported property
in the propagation of religion and (2) the use of compulsory public
school machinery to provide pupils for the religious classes. If the use
of tax-supported property was the crucial factor in the McCollum case,
then the Supreme Court might possibly declare the New York "released
time" program constitutional because no religious instruction was given
on public school property. If it does so rule, the Court might be compelled to retract some of the statements made in the McCollum case,
e.g., that "the First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and
State which must be kept high and impregnable." 333 U. S. at 212.
If the use of the compulsory public school machinery was also a crucial
factor in determining the constitutionality of the "released time" program, then the cited decision would almost certainly be reversed since
there was, to some extent, use of this machinery. This was the position
taken by the dissenting judge in the instant case where he stated,
100 N.E. (2d) at 478:
What is vital and operative is, not where the religious teaching is
given, but that it secures its pupils -through the instrumentality of the
state and through the machinery and momentum of the public school
system.

The fact remains that the basis for the Supreme Court decision
in the McCollum case was undoubtedly the "wall of separation" phrase
used by Jefferson. The Court's magnification of Jefferson's "wall"
appears fantastic. As pointed out by Judge Desmond in his concurring
opinion in the instant case, no true "wall" has ever existed. 100 N.E.
(2d) at 472. Justice Reed was of the same opinion in his dissent to the
McCollur decision, for he maintained that even Jefferson did not
exclude religious education from the state-controlled University of
Virginia, an institution he himself founded. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, supra, 333 U. S. at 245-7. And the Federal Government still has compulsory religious services in both the United States
Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy and maintains
chaplains in the armed forces and in Congress. O'NWEL, RELIGION AND
EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 200 (1949).

Judge Desmond brought the real problem into focus when he stated
in the concurring opinion, 100 N.E. (2d) at 471:
The basic fundamental here at hazard is not . . . any so-called (but
nonexistent . . .) "principle" of complete separation of religion from
government. . . . The true and real principle that calls for assertion

here is that of the right of parents to control the education of their
children, so long as they provide them with the State-mandated minimum
of secular learning, and the right of parents to raise and instruct their
children in any religion chosen by the parents. .

.

. Those are true

and absolute rights under natural law, antedating, and superior to, any
human constitution or statute.

It is the view of the writer that the New York "released time"
program is nothing more than a method which allows for the exercise
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of the religious liberties of the parents of public school pupils, and
infringes on the rights of no one. As Judge Desmond, quoting Kent,
pointed out in his concluding sentence, 100 N.E. (2d) at 474, "the
Constitution 'never meant to withdraw religion in general, and with it
the best sanctions of moral and social obligation, from all consideration
and notice of the law.'
William N. Antonis

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SMITH ACT COMMUNIST PARTY AS A
AND PRESENT DANGER. Dennis v. United States,.341 U. S.

CLEAR

494, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951). The defendant and ten
others were indicted and convicted for conspiring to organize a society
of persons known as the Communist Party of America which allegedly
advocated the violent overthrow of the United States Government. This
conspiracy was clearly a violation of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11
(1946). The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question
whether the designated sections of the Act clashed with either the
First or Fifth Amendment. Chief Justice Vinson spoke for the majority
and resolved the question in the negative. Stating that these sections
of the Act came within the "clear and present danger" test, the Chief
Justice affirmed the conviction.
Whether the "clear and present danger" test is the proper measure
to determine the constitutionality of legislation has provoked considerable discussion during the last decade. In Schenck v. United States,
249 U. S. 47, 52, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919), Justice Holmes
brought forth the "clear and present" dictum when he wrote:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that -they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent.

This oft-quoted phrase has given rise to several constitutional questions
concerning the right and extent of free speech for underlying it is the
fundamental problem of the relationship between liberty and authority.
In constitutional law these concepts are often seen encroaching upon
the territory of each other. Some people are resigned to think of them
as perpetually conflicting; others believe them to be antithetical concepts, depending upon which side of the political pendulum they cling
to. In reality they are correlative terms, a political projection of the
reciprocal relationship between right and duty. This truism was dearly
indicated by SIMON, TnE ACQUINAS LECTURE 2 (1940), writing on the
"Nature and Functions of Authority":
As to their complementary character, it is quite clear that authority,
when it is not fairly balanced by liberty, is but tyranny, and that liberty,
when it is not fairly balanced by authority, is but abusive license.
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From the standpoint of the judiciary, the practical application of
this relationship as to the freedom of speech (liberty) and the limitation
of this freedom (authority) received a helping hand when Holmes
announced his "clear and present danger" maxim in the Schenck case,
supra. Schenck had been indicted under the Criminal Espionage Act, 40
STAT. 217 (1917), for obstructing recruiting for the armed services.
Holmes, without any question as to the validity of the statute, affirmed
the conviction on the ground that Schenck's actions were a clear and
present danger to the welfare of the United States. Subsequently,
Holmes, with reference to the Schenck case, affirmed two other cases
which involved the Espionage Act. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S.
204, 39 S. Ct. 249, 63 L. Ed. 561 (1919) (news publications attacking
the war); Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 S. Ct. 252, 63
L. Ed. 566 (1919) (a speech denouncing the war).
Essentially then, Holmes maintained that only those actions, against
which Congress had a right to legislate and which presented an imminent threat could be punished. However, in Gitlow v. United States,
268 U. S. 652, 669, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925), which
involved a New York statute enjoining criminal anarchy, the Court
refused the clear and present danger approach citing with approval
from People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505, 512 (1922):

. . . the

legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine
designed and intended to overthrow -the government, without waiting
until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan
advocated.

And at 268 U. S. at 670, the Court further stated:
In other words, when the legislative body has determined generally,
in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain
kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished,
the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited
class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not
open to consideration.

Thus the Court considered that if in the discretion of the legislature
certain utterances involved a substantive evil, the utterances were
punishable, not because they were dangerous, but because they were
forbidden. Cushman, "Clear and Present Danger" in Free Speech
Cases: A Study in JudicialSemantics in EssAYs IN POLITICAL THEoRY
311 (Konvitz & Murphy 1948). Holmes naturally registered a dissent
to this decision.
Although Holmes' test was set aside in this case, and in others
which came later, this was only temporary. Over a decade ago the
Supreme Court again began employing the "clear and present" phraseology in cases other than those involving espionage and criminal anarchy. The utilization of the doctrine in different types of cases
naturally meant that it was undergoing an expansion program; but
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moreover the Court had now turned the "clear and present danger" test
into a yardstick to measure the validity of statutes affecting the freedom
of speech, press and religion. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 69
S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516,
65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S.
583, 63 S. Ct. 1200, 87 L. Ed. 1600 (1943); West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628
(1943); Carlson v. California,310 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed.
1104 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84
L. Ed. 1093 (1940).
In Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, the Court struck down an Alabama
statute as violative of freedom of speech and press. The statute was
directed at picketing and made it unlawful for any person without a
just or legal excuse to loiter about a place of business with the intention
of influencing others to refrain from any business intercourse with the
establishment. The late Justice Murphy in delivering the Court's opinion stated, 310 U. S. at 104-5:
Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where
the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording
no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion.

Carlson v. California, supra, substantially supports this proposition.
Extending its reasoning in the same manner in Taylor v. Mississippi,
supra, the Court reversed a conviction and declared a Mississippi statute
contrary to the liberties established by the Fourteenth Amendment.
There, Taylor, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, contravened the statute by distributing pamphlets which were allegedly calculated to
encourage disloyalty to the United States and Mississippi as well as
create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute the national and
state flags. The Court declared that no clear danger resulted from
Taylor's action and voided the statute which prohibited the distribution.
A recent case illustrating the new broad application of the "clear and
present danger" test is Terminiello v. Chicago, supra. Terminiello, a
Catholic priest then under suspension by his bishop, spoke to approximately 800 people in a Chicago auditorium. His speech was a vile,
harangue-like denunciation of several religious and political groups,
and resulted in a cross between breach of the peace and riot. Justice
Douglas reasoned for the majority that the ordinance prohibiting such
conduct was unconstitutional as applied. He declared, 337 U. S. at 4,
that although speech is sometimes provocative and challenging, it is
...nevertheless protected . . . unless shown likely to produce a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience....

These decisions definitely indicate that the present Court has utilized
Holmes' maxim as a test for the constitutionality of statutes affecting
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the exercise of free speech and press. In the principal case, the Court
held that as a matter of law, a clear and present danger does exist as
a result of the activities of the Communist Party and that therefore the
Smith Act is constitutional. More significant than this further extension
of the Holmes' test is that the Court now has not only this test but also
the Gitlow rule to determine the constitutionality of statutes similar
to the Smith Act in the future.
Recapitulating for a moment, the Gitlow case, which concerned itself
with a statute substantially the same as in the present case, rejected,
or at least ignored, Holmes' test and upheld the statute merely because
it was the product of "constitutional" legislative discretion. The case
has never been overruled and instead has been cited as authority on
several occasions. Consequently, in the future the Court has a choice
either to continue to rely on the "clear and present danger" doctrine
as precedent, or, if they reject this test, to revive the Gitlow holding
as authority in the other approach to the problem.
Thomas Meaney, Jr.

INSURANCE -

LIFE INSURANCE -

CHANGE

or

BENEFICIARY

BY

WILL. - Stone v. Stephens,--- Ohio...., 99 N.E. (2d) 766 (1951). This
action was instituted to resolve conflicting claims to the proceeds of two
life insurance policies. The insured had designated the plaintiff, then his
wife, as the beneficiary in both policies. Although the plaintiff later obtained a divorce from the insured, no attempt was made to exercise the
reserved right to change the beneficiary according to the formal method
prescribed in the policy. After the divorce had been granted, the insured
executed his will and in a pertinent clause provided that if he should
die unmarried all his property should go to his grandmother, the
defendant in this action. While serving as a pilot in the Royal Air
Force, the insured disappeared at sea and was later declared dead. The
insurance companies, acknowledging their liability, were interpleaded.
A bare majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the attempt
to change the beneficiary by will was ineffective since the policy did
not expressly or impliedly permit it. When the will took effect at death,
the right of the designated beneficiary was already fixed by law and
could not be altered by the interpleader of the companies. The dissenting judges were of the opinion that the provisions regarding the change
of beneficiary protected only the companies, and that since these provisions were waived by the interpleader, the intent of the insured manifested in the will should prevail.
While the number of cases involving the question of a change of
beneficiary in a life insurance policy has afforded the courts abundant

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

opportunity to examine this problem, the yield in precise formulations
is relatively sparse. See Grismore, Changing the Beneficiary of a Life
Insurance Contract, 48 MICH. L. REv. 591 (1950). When the insured
reserves the right to change the beneficiary and the policy recites
formalities necessary to effect the change, may the insured pass over
these provisions and change the beneficiary by will? The answer to
this question has resulted in a division of the authorities and a development of the customary majority and minority decisions.
Common to both the majority and minority views are several underlying principles. Although these principles are lacking in perfected,
definitive development, they are undisputed as isolated theorems. Since
these principles are fundamental to a dissection of the problem of
changing a beneficiary in a life insurance policy, they deserve mention
at the outset. When ruling on the interest which the named beneficiary
takes in a policy, where the right to change beneficiaries is reserved,
the courts are in agreement that the interest is not vested until the
death of the insured. During the life of the insured, the interest may
be defeated and is an expectancy or contingent interest only. Supreme
Council of Royal Arcanum v. Behrend, 247 U. S. 394, 38 S. Ct. 522,
62 L. Ed. 1182 (1918); Katz v. Ohio National Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531,
191 N.E. 782 (1934); Oetting v. Sparks, 109 Ohio St. 94, 143 N.E.
184 (1923). Although this concept of the expectancy interest is generally accepted, its application in a great number of conflicting cases
demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive analysis. In Parks'
Ex'rs v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. (2d) 480 (1941), the court
suggested that in the accurate, technical sense an expectancy interest
gives the named beneficiary a present, relatively secure right subject
only to possible divestiture within the bounds of the contractual procedure. Under this interpretation the right of the beneficiary is subject
to defeat only by exercise of the reserve power. See Grismore, supra.
Most jurisdictions, including Ohio, do not require actual compliance
with the policy provisions relating to change of beneficiary. A change
will be permitted where substantial performance of the conditions is
shown. Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 109, 150
N.E. 748 (1926); Arnold v. Newcomb, 104 Ohio St. 578, 136 N.E.
206 (1922). Some courts invoke the equitable principle and regard
as done that which ought to be done where the insured has done all
that he could under the circumstances to effect the change. Barrett v.
Barrett, 173 Ga. 375, 160 S.E. 399 (1931).
The instant case typifies the majority rule that a change of beneficiary must be accomplished in rather strict accordance with the
provisions of the policy. Under this view, it was held in Fink v. Fink,
171 N. Y. 616, 64 N.E. 506 (1902), that letters written by the insured
shortly before his death requesting a change of beneficiary, did not
follow the prescribed method and could not effect a change. The court
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pointed out that the contract provisions protected the named beneficiary
and distinguished unexecuted power from intention to execute a change.
This principle was reaffirmed, where wills were used to make the
change, in Pruchnowskiv. PrudentialIns. Co. of America, 242 App. Div.
899, 276 N. Y. Supp. 84 (4th Dep't 1934); Martinelli v. Cometti, 133
Misc. 810, 234 N. Y. Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1929). When provisions set
forth in the policy are not complied with, the less flexible majority
view denies recovery to claimants under a will. Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal.
(2d) 639, 111 P. (2d) 322 (1941); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones,
307 Ill. App. 652, 30 N.E. (2d) 937 (1940); Parks' Ex'rs v. Parks,
supra; Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, 11 N.W. (2d) 1 (1943);
Martinelli v. Cometti, supra; Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484,
166 S.E. 621 (1932).
When considering whether interpleader of the insurance company
waives the change provisions, some courts, supporting the strict majority
view, have stated that the contingent interest of the beneficiary vests
upon the death of the insured and that subsequent acts will not affect
the vested right. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, supra, 30 N.E.
(2d) at 939; Dogariu v. Dogariu, supra, 11 N.W. (2d) at 7. Perhaps
a better reason for this contention is that the provisions protect the
beneficiary as well as the company and the company cannot waive the
right of the beneficiary. Wannamaker v. Stroman, supra, 166 S.E. at
623. In support of the majority view, it has been said that the public
interest would suffer from -the uncertainties if testamentary changes
were allowed. Dogariu v. Dogariu,supra, 11 N. W. (.2d) at 7; Wannamaker v. Stroman, supra, 166 S.E. at 623.
According to the minority view, when the policy allows a change
of beneficiary but is silent as to the mode required, a will may properly
execute the change. Townsend v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,
163 Iowa 713, 144 N.W. 574 (1913). If the contract provisions do not
extend protection to the nominated beneficiary, the interest which the
beneficiary takes under the policy is said to be limited so as to be
defeated by any clear expression of intent to do so. See Grismore, supra.
In line with this reasoning, this minority of the courts has dispensed
with the stringent requirement of following the policy provisions, regards the provisions as safeguards for the insurer alone and holds that
the unequivocal intention expressed in the will controls. Arrington v.
Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 21 F. (2d) 914
(5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 617, 48 S. Ct. 213, 72 L. Ed.
733 (1928); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 67 F. Supp. 159
(W. D. Mo. 1946); Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W. (2d) 70
(1937); Eickelkamp v. Carl, 193 Ark. 1155, 104 S.W. (2d) 814 (f937)
(follows Pedron case); Finnerty v.Cook, 118 Colo. 310, 195 P. (2d)
973 (1948); Hunter v. Hunter, 100 S. C. 517, 84 S.E. 180 (1915)
(declaration in extremis).
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An Ohio court in a decision prior to the instant case had stated that
the requirements in the, policy benefited the insurer alone. Atkinson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, 150 N.E. at 752. Although this case
did not involve a will, an essential element of the liberal rule was
favorably recognized. In Pedron v. Olds, supra, 105 S.W. (2d) at 71-2,
the court examined the policy provisions relating to change of beneficiary and concluded that the provisions were obviously for the benefit
of the insurer. Variations of the formalities providing for a change of
beneficiary in a life insurance policy undoubtedly exist, but these are
differences in form only. The essence of the provisions which create
the interest is basically the same. When the policy is not contained
in the record and the court is unable to scrutinize the contract conferring the interest in question, a testamentary change of beneficiary is
valid. Benson v. Benson, 125 Okla. 151, 256 Pac. 912 (1927). When the
policy does not extend a secure interest to the beneficiary, the interest
the beneficiary takes is similar and equal to that of a legatee under a
will. Since both claimants have similar interests according to the
minority contention, the last declared intent prevails. Pedron v. Olds,
supra.
Although the decision in the instant case strengthens the position
supported by the majority of the courts, whether it adds to the rationale
of the basic problem is uncertain. If an exact exposition of the contractual conditions had been conducted, perhaps it would have obviated the
necessity for oblique references to expectancy interests and somewhat
fanciful conceptions of public policy. When considered in the light of
the practicalities surrounding these cases, the solution of the minority,
in addition to its equitable features, seems to be more penetrating.
William J. Hurley

TAXATION - EmPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP UNDER FEDERAL
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. Ringling Bros. - Barnum & Bailey Com-

bined Shows, Inc. v. Higgins, 189 F. (2d) 865 (2d Cir. 1951). This
case deals with the common law concepts of master and servant and
their application in determining who are employees under the Social
Security Act. The court affirmed the trial judge's holding that where
the ultimate power of direction and control resides in the employer
there is an employee relationship, not that of independent contractor.
The taxpayer, a circus corporation, brought action for refund of
moneys paid as unemployment taxes. The parties joined issue on
whether certain persons in the plaintiff's employ during the year 1936
were employees, as held by the trial court, or independent contractors,
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in which case the tax is not applicable. Involved are the so-called
"producing" clowns, who developed the original ideas for their acts
and the "feature" acts, which included aerial trapeze, balancing, highwire, seal, horse, dog, comic acrobatic and "human cannonball" acts.
The plaintiff entered into contracts with these "producing" clowns and
"feature" acts for an entire season, at the same time retaining an
option to renew the contract for the next succeeding season upon the
same terms. Each act was contracted for as a "package"; the contract
was ordinarily made with the head of the act, and he alone was paid
for it. Costumes and all properties were supplied by the several acts
and remained under their sole control.
There are at least two lines of cases, each backed by substantial
and reputable authority, and which have reached opposite results in
resolving the problem presented in this case. It is essentially a conflict between adherents of strict common law tests of master and servant
and those stressing the spirit of the legislation and the broad coverage
under the Act. The instant case appears to fall into the latter grouping,
as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, despite a recent amendment
to the Social Security Act calling for application of the "usual" common
law tests.
Since the inception of federal social security legislation in 1935, 49
STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1946), the varying opinions
of the courts have consistently assumed that there is some simple,
uniform test easily applied to determine whether persons doing work
for others fall into the class of employee or independent contractor.
Unfortunately, this is not true. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
322 U. S.111, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944), the Court said
that the relatively simple formula, developed after a "long and tortuous" history for deciding responsibility in tort, has by no means
been controlling in the field of social legislation. See Murray's Case,
130 Me. 181, 154 Atl. 352 (1931); In re Rheinwald, 168 App. Div.
425, 153 N. Y. Supp. 598 (3d Dep't 1915).
In comparatively recent years a wide variety of state jurisdictions
have pioneered in effecting a departure from the common law tests.
They have repeatedly held that the social benefit statutes should be
given a broad application as remedial legislation. McKinley, Com'r of
Labor v. R. L. Payne & Son Lumber Co., 200 Ark. 1114, 143 S.W.
(2d) 38 (1940). Interpretation of the definitions given in these statutes differs from similar common law concepts, and the relationship
defined in the statutes has been held to go beyond the common law
test for determining responsibility for tortious conduct. Globe Grain &
Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 98 Utah 36, 91 P. (2d) 512
(1939); see In re Zeits, 108 Ind. App. 617, 31 N.E. (2d) 209 (1941);
Unemployment Compensation Commission of North Carolina v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S.E. (2d) 584 (1939).
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Despite this trend established by a minority of state court opinions,
federal social legislation continued to be interpreted in the light of
conventional common law tests. Vaughan v. Warner, 157 F. (2d) 26
(3d Cir. 1946); Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.
(2d) 715 (2d Cir. 1943). Legislative intent was presumed to be in
harmony with the term "employee" as the common law knew it.
American Oil Co. v. Fly, 135 F. (2d) 491 (5th Cir. 1943); Jones v.
Goodson, 121 F. (2d) 176 (10th Cir. 1941); Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118
F. (2d) 636 (2d Cir. 1941).
Judge Learned Hand laid down the rule subscribed to by the common law bank of jurists in Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United
States, supra, 135 F. (2d) at 717. He believed the real test to lie "... in
the degree to which the principal may intervene to control the details
of the agent's performance," and that there could be nothing more
to say even though "the regulation redundantly elaborated it."
At least one court, Williams v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 129 (7th
Cir. 1942), saw the purposes of the Social Security Act being defeated
in the application of the strict control doctrine or common law rules
of agency. In holding the plaintiff, an orchestra leader, instead of the
establishment for which the orchestra performed, liable for social
security taxes as the employer, the court took cognizance of the unfortunate situation resulting from its holding, but said, 126 F. (2d) at
133-4, that the plaintiff's appeal must be addressed to Congress rather
than to the courts which are without power to legislate.
The first promise of a change to come in interpreting federal social
legislation was noted in the field of workmens' compensation. NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, supra, 322 U. S. at 129, rejected the test of
the "technical concepts pertinent to an employer's legal responsibility
to third persons for the acts of his servants." This test is often referred
to as power of control, whether exercised or not, over the manner of
performing services. "Employee" as used in the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1946), as
amended, 61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Supp. 1951), had
been earlier construed by the Supreme Court as having no definite
meaning in the sense of being a word of art, but rather a word taking
its color and meaning from the statute in the "light of the mischief
to be corrected." South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S
251, 259, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L. Ed. 732 (1940). See United States v.
American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U. S.534, 60 S.Ct. 1059,
84 L. Ed. 1345 (1940).
The decision in United States v. Silk, 331 U. S.704, 67 S.Ct. 1463,
91 L. Ed. 1757 (1947), first made it evident that the Supreme Court
gave sanction to judicial thinking which was not concerned solely with
the immediate technical relation of employer and employee in applying
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social security legislation. The Court expressed approval of its earlier
ruling in the Hearst case, supra, and further clarified itself by saying,
331 U. S. at 712:
As -the federal social security legislation is an attack on recognized
evils in our national economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing
by the courts would not comport with its purpose. Such an interpretation
would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the
difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit
schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate
burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation.

See Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 66 S. Ct. 637,
90 L. Ed. 718 (1946); Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, Commissioner of the Department of Labor of Arkansas, 308 U. S. 358, 60
S. Ct. 279, 84 L. Ed. 322 (1939).
In the same year, the Supreme Court in Bartels v. Birmingham, 332
U.S. 126, 67 S. Ct. 1547, 91 L. Ed. 1947 (1947), further disavowed the
control doctrine in the application of social legislation. The Court held
that all are employees who as a matter of "economic reality" are dependent upon the business to which they render service.
Almost immediately after this decision, Congress passed an amendment to the original Social Security Act. 49 STAT. 647 (1935), 42
U.S.C. § 301 (1946), as amended, 53 STAT. 1398 (1939), 62 STAT. 438
(1948), 26 U.S.C. § 1607 (i) (Supp. 1951). This amendment provides
that the term "employee" shall not include:
(1) any individual who, under the usual common-law rules applicable in
determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an
independent contractor, or (2) any individual (except an officer of a
corporation) who is not an employee under such common-law rides.
[Emphasis supplied.)

This amendment is apparently a direct rejection of the "economic
reality" test advanced in United States v. Silk, supra, and Bartels v.
Birmingham, supra, and manifests congressional approval of Judge
Learned Hand's "control" test advanced in Radio City Music Hall
Corp. v. United States, supra. See Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172
F. (2d) 87 (7th Cir. 1949); Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. United
States, 84 F. Supp. 435 (W. D. La. 1949).
Since there is no certainty as to what is the usual common law test,
it was hardly to be expected that the spirit behind the "economic
reality" doctrine of the Bartels case would be shelved for long. Despite
extensive lip-service to the amendment and the Radio City Music Hall
case, the instant opinion gives the impression of casting about for a
rewording of the "economic reality" doctrine in an attempt to conform
to both.
Joseph H. Harrison
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TAXATION -

FEDERAL INCOME TAXES -

TAXABILITY OF GAINS

United States v. Rugtkin, 189 F. (2d)
431 (3d Cir. 1951). The appellant, James Rutkin, was convicted of
willfully attempting to evade income and victory taxes under INT.
FROM ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS. -

REV. CODE § 145(b). Rutkin had received $250,000 from one Reinfeld,

who charged that the payment was made as the result of threats to
kill and show of force by Rutkin. Rutkin contended that the payment
was made in final settlement of his asserted interest in a certain partnership which was partly owned by Reinfeld. This contention was
supported by the fact that Rutkin gave Reinfeld and others a general
release of all his rights in the partnership at the time of payment. He
claimed that the payment was not reportable income by him on the
ground that the partnership had previously paid the capital gains tax
on the money. On the basis of Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U. S. 404,
66 S. Ct. 546, 90 L. Ed. 752 (1946), the court, holding that the money
received by Rutkin was obtained under a semblance of a claim of right
and that a definite unconditional obligation to repay or return the
money was absent, affirmed the conviction. The dissenting opinion
also applied the rule of the Wilcox case, but held that on the basis
of the extortion, Rutkin did not receive the money under a bona fide
claim of right and consequently had no title to it, so that the money
was not taxable to him.
The issue here rests upon the interpretation of Section 22 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code as to what constitutes a taxable gain.

The general rule, well established by the decisions even before the
Wilcox case, was that gains from illegal transactions are income and
taxable to the wrongdoer. In Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F. (2d)
340 (7th Cir. 1942), ransom money and protection payments were
taxable. Overcharges of passenger fares in excess of tariff provisions,
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Commissioner, 47 F. (2d) 990 (7th Cir.
1931), and misapplied funds due to a breach of trust between attorney
and client, United States v. Wampler, 5 F. Supp. 796 (D. Md. 1934),
were also taxed. Gains from usury, Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d) 122
(D. C. Cir. 1938); graft money, Chadick v. United States, 77 F. (2d)
961 (5th Cir. 1935); unlawful bonuses, Board v. Commissioner, 51 F.
(2d) 73 (6th Cir. 1931); and "kickbacks" on contracts and gambling
gains, Caldwell v. Commissioner, 135 F. (2d) 488 (5th Cir. 1943),
were all held taxable income.
Several decisions deviated from this general rule and held that
embezzled funds were not taxable. McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F.
(2d) 572 (5th Cir. 1942); Rau v. United States, 260 Fed. 131 (2d Cir.
1919). However, the Rau case was overruled by National City Bank of
New York v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93 (2d Cir. 1938), and another
case, Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F. (2d) 723 (8th Cir. 1942), held that
embezzled funds were taxable. These cases exemplify the divergence
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of opinion in the circuit courts on the question whether embezzled
funds are taxable.
Underlying the general rule that gains from illegal transactions
are taxable income to the wrongdoer are several basic principles. Primarily, it is well settled that Congress has the power to tax what it
prohibits. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 47 S. Ct. 607, 71
L. Ed. 1037 (1927). Secondly, a wrongdoer cannot set up his own
wrongdoing as a lawful reason for escaping the tax on the gains derived
from the wrong. Board v. Commissioner, supra; United States v.
Wampler, supra. Finally, the system of federal income taxation is
based upon an annual accounting period requiring the determination
of income at the close of the taxable year without regard to the effect
of later events. The practical difficulties which would result from the
use of any other system of assessment clearly emphasize the importance
of this factor. Haberkorn v. United States, 173 F. (2d) 587 (6th Cir.
1949) ; Barkerv. Magruder,supra.
In the leading case embodying these principles to support the general
rule, North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424,
52 S. Ct. 613, 76 L. Ed. 1197 (1932), the Court stated:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which -he is
required -to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged
liable to restore its equivalent.

Two important concepts are manifested by this rule; namely, the
claim of right doctrine and the objective probability of retention test.
It is upon these considerations that the cases dealing with this subject
have usually been founded. Nevertheless, a few decisions have been
distinguished from the North American case by utilizing various other
theories, notably, Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 143 F.
(2d) 1007 (6th Cir. 1944), and Greenwald v. United States, 57 F.
Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944). In the former the stockholders of a corporation were deemed constructive trustees of a dividend subsequently
rescinded. The latter held that the claim of right doctrine of the North
American decision did not apply because the money in question was
paid under a mistake of fact.
The Wilcox case itself held that embezzled funds were not taxable
income to the embezzler and laid down the rule applied in the principal
case. Undoubtedly, the Wilcox decision is a departure 'from the general
rule that gains from illegal transactions are to be taxed even though
the Court seemingly justified its opinion by stating that the embezzler
received the funds under no claim of right and simultaneously with the
act of embezzling incurred an unconditional obligation to repay or
return the money. In Gilken Corporationv. Commissioner, 176 F. (2d)
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141 (6th Cir. 1949), the court made no mention of the Wilcox case,
but quoted from Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 54 S. Ct. 356, 78
L. Ed. 725 (1934), to the effect that the determinative factor is the
unrestricted use, enjoyment and disposition of the income in question
during the taxable year. Considering this factor alone, as a practical
matter the embezzler does have unrestricted use, enjoyment and disposition of the funds.
The recent cases have generally not followed the Wilcox case which
was purported to be the test under Section 22(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code as to what constituted a taxable gain. CapitalWarehouse
Co. v. Commissioner, 171 F. (2d) 395 (8th Cir. 1948); United States
v. Chapman, 168 F. (2d) 997 (7th Cir. 1948). An exception to this
statement was Gargarov. United States, 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. Cl. 1947),
which applied the Wilcox rule.
The courts have taken great pains to distinguish the cases from
the Wilcox decision in order to apply the rule adopted in North
American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, supra. Some have made the
distinction that the "no restriction as to disposition" clause in the
North American rule applies even though the "definite unconditional
obligation to repay or return" requirement of the Wilcox rule has not
been satisfied. Fleischer v: Commissioner, 158 F. (2d) 42 (8th Cir.
1946). Akers v. Scofield, 167 F. (2d) 718 (5th Cir. 1948), involving
swindled funds, applied the rule of the North American decision and
emphasized that there was no debtor-creditor relation as there was in
the Wilcox case. Haberkorn v. United States, supra, was held to be
controlled by the North American case and different from the Wilcox
case in that the receipt of the money and the obligation to repay
or return in the Wilcox case took place simultaneously, whereas in
Haberkorn the holder treated the money received as his own, without
restriction for over a year before an unconditional obligation to repay
it arose.
It is well to note, also, that most of the dissension caused by the
interpretations of Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as to
what constitutes a taxable gain has its origin in the remedy provided
where gains, previously reported, are repaid later. At present, the
remedy is not to sue the Collector to recover the excess tax paid, but
to claim the repayment as a deduction from income in the year in
which it is repaid or returned. Anderson v. Bowers, 170 F. (2d) 676
(4th Cir. 1948). Undoubtedly, the most equitable remedy is to amend
the Internal Revenue Code so that a taxpayer who restores income,
previously reported, to its rightful owner may amend his return and
obtain a refund of the excess tax paid.
The decision of the principal case while in accord with the general
rule requiring taxation of gains from illegal transactions would be more
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convincing had it been based upon the rule manifested by North
American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, supra. It is evident that the
latter rule has been given much support by the courts and is in
complete harmony with the present system of taxation.
Robert L. Berry

TAXATION -

TAXPAYER'S APPLIcATION OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN

Tim EXERcISE OF ITS GOVERNMENTAL

PowER. - Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F. (2d) 283 (D. C. Cir.
1951). Louis Stockstrom filed no gift tax return for 1938, though he
had made several gifts in trust of less than $5000 each. He paid no
tax for that year because the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was,
at the time, collecting gift taxes according to a court ruling that gifts
in trust were gifts of present interests. By statute, gifts of present
interests of less than $5000 were tax exempt. A revenue agent called
Stockstrom's attention to his failure to file. The agent and a representative of Stockstrom immediately brought the matter before the Bureau
of Internal Revenue at St. Louis. There, an official told them that
since no tax was due, no return need be filed. In 1948 the Commissioner,
to comply with a new court holding, changed his regulations with
regard to the nature of the interest transferred by a gift in trust. He
then sent the estate of the since deceased Stockstrom a notice of a tax
deficiency due on the gifts made in 1938 and of penalties as a result
of the nonpayment. When the executor of the estate petitioned for
a redetermination the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's findings.
On review the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered
the issue to be, not whether a present or future interest had been
granted, but whether the Government was estopped from contending
that the decedent's failure to file a tax return had prevented the three
year statute of limitations from running. The court held that the
doctrine of estoppel, available to the Government, was also available
against it. Because the taxpayer's omission, after he had become aware
of his neglect, was caused by his reliance upon the declarations of a
Government agent, the Commissioner was estopped from pleading, in
suspension of the statute of limitations, that no return had been filed.
The dissenting judge expressed regret that the law was not as the
majority of the court had stated, but maintained the rule was well
established that the Government is not subject to estoppel in tax
matters.
Courts have sometimes divided the functions of the Federal Government into two classes: governmental or sovereign and corporate or
proprietary. Elrod Slug Casting Mack. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp.
915 (D. Neb. 1944). It is the opinion of this writer that, since the
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powers of the Federal Government are specifically enunciated and
limited by the Constitution, this division is not technically correct.
Strictly speaking, the Government possesses only governmental powers
and the non-governmental, commercial activities in which it engages
are allowed only because they are concomitant with and result from
the exercise of the governmental powers.
When the Federal Government has entered the commercial world
it has been held subject to the same laws as individuals. Jay Cooke &
Co. v. United States, 91 U. S. 389, 23 L. Ed. 237 (1875). It possesses
the same rights and is subject to the same liabilities as any other
business: "The United States does business on business terms." United
States v. National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U. S. 527, 534,
46 S. Ct. 388, 70 L. Ed. 717, 719 (1926).
When the United States acts in its governmental capacity, the
general rule is that it is not subject to the doctrine of estoppel. Gibbons
v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 19 L. Ed. 453 (U. S. 1869); United
States v. City of Greenville, 118 F. (2d) 963 (4th Cir. 1941); United
States v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 64 F. Supp. 269 (S. D. W. Va.
1946). Under this rule, neither an erroneous interpretation of a law,
Stewart v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 145 (N. D. Cal. 1938), which
is considered a nullity, Ben Stocker, 12 B.T.A. 1348 (1928), nor laches,
United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720, 6 L. Ed. 199 (U. S.1824),
is sufficient to support the application of equitable estoppel.
This general rule was invoked in deciding a tax question in Elrod
Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, supra, at 920, where the court
said, "The assessment and collection of revenues is a governmental
function, and the doctrine of estoppel has no place here."
The strongest argument infavor of the existence of this immunity
is its effectiveness in guaranteeing to the nation the benefit and protection of its laws, free from the errors of human agents. The good
resulting from the protection of the public interest is said to outweigh
the evil of denying to individuals the defense of estoppel. As it was
stated in Gibbons v. United States, supra, 19 L. Ed. at 454,
No government has ever held itself liable to individuals for the
misfeasance, laches or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers and
agents.
In the language of Judge Story, ..."It does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of any of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, and difficulties, and losses, which would be subversive
of the public interests."

An indication that the Government might be subjected to the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, even in the exercise of its governmental
powers, can be found in dicta in several cases. Barnett Inv. Co. v. Nee,
72 F. Supp. 81 (W. D. Mo. 1947). "The doctrine of ...estoppel must
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be applied with great caution to the Government and its officials. But
in proper circumstances it does apply." Vestal v. Commissioner, 152
F. (2d) 132, 136 (D. C. Cir. 1945). The court further stated that
estoppel could only be maintained when the agents have acted within
their authority. One decision, James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1151
(1928), implied that the Government might be subjected to an estoppel
even in the exercise of its power to tax. It said, however, that the
g... necessity inherent in its sovereign power of taxation. . ." would
allow the Government to be estopped only in the most extraordinary
situation.
The instant case is disturbing for the reason that the cases most
heavily relied upon by the court to substantiate its opinion fail to
accomplish that purpose. Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254, 19 L. Ed.
554 (U.S. 1870); Thomson v. Poor, 147 N.Y. 402, 42 N.E. 13 (1895);
Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489, 44 N. E. 167 (1896), and Imperator
Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920), relied upon
by the court involved controversies between individuals, and though
they enunciate maxims regarding the use of equitable estoppel, they
tell us nothing of the position of the Government under the doctrine.
The keystone, as it were, of the court's opinion is R. H. Stearns Co.
v. United States, 291 U. S. 54, 54 S. Ct. 325, 78 L. Ed. 647 (1934),
but it can be distinguished from the principal case - there the Government succeeded in estopping a taxpayer. Of the cases cited, United
States v. Peck, 102 U. S. 64, 26 L. Ed. 46 (1880) most nearly approaches the instant case in its holding, but there the Government was
estopped from alleging non-performance of a contract obligation because its agents had rendered performance by the defendant impossible.
The court's decision, though weakly supported and contrary to the
general rule, is, because of the facts of the case, more in accord with
a layman's view of justice than would have been a holding based on
the rule. Though the public interest argues strongly for the existence
of the rule, it should be tempered in order to give more consideration
to the rights of individuals, even against their government. It is submitted that the public interest might be better served by a modification
of the rule making it more difficult for the Government to repudiate
the acts and representations of its agents, and forcing it to place a
greater premium upon the ability of applicants for responsible Government posts.
Robert F. McCoy

TITLE REGISTRATION STATUTES - INTERPRETATION OF CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE ACT. - Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.
(2d) 665 (1951). The plaintiff, Kelley Kar Company, sold an automobile to one Anderson under a conditional sales contract signed in Call-
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fornia. Anderson then took the car to Vermont where he fraudulently
procured a certificate from the Vermont Motor Vehicle Department
which indicated that he was the owner of the automobile and that his
title was unencumbered. Appearing in Cleveland with the car, Anderson
secured an Ohio certificate of title from the Clerk of Courts of Cuyahoga County to replace the Vermont certificate. Anderson did not
inform the clerk of the interest of the Kelley Kar Company. The
defendant, Finkler, relying upon the Ohio certificate held by Anderson,
purchased the car from him and an Ohio certificate of title was issued
to Finkler upon surrender of the one held by Anderson. The Kelley Kar
Company learned that the automobile was in Finkler's possession and
brought this action of replevin, also claiming $3000 as damages. The
issue in the case was whether a certificate of title, though born in fraud,
will prevail in the hands of an innocent purchaser over the claim of the
conditional vendor. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that since the
right, title and claim of interest of the Kelley Kar Company to the
motor vehicle was not evidenced by a certificate of title, its claim
could not be recognized.
The reasoning relied upon by the court appears to be contrary
to the majority rule exemplified in another recent Ohio case, Associates
Discount Corp. v. Colonial Finance Co., 88 Ohio App. 205, 98 N.E.
(2d) 848 (1950). There the conditional sales contract was duly
recorded pursuant to the laws of New York. The court, in upholding
the claim of the conditional vendor as against the claim of the mortgagee of an innocent purchaser in Ohio, applied the majority rule that
where a conditional vendor has complied with the recording statutes
of his own jurisdiction, his lien has priority over the claim of a bona
fide purchaser from the conditional vendee in a foreign jurisdiction.
Pruitt Truck & Implement Co. v. Ferguson, 216 Ark. 848, 227 S.W.
(2d) 944 (1950); Farnham v. Eichin, 230 App. Div. 639, 246 N. Y.
Supp. 133 (3d Dep't 1930).
An exception to the majority rule is allowed where the conditional
vendor and vendee contemplate that the property will be removed to
and used in a state other than that in which it was located at the time
of the execution of the contract. It is held that the seller impliedly
consents to the removal and the recording laws of the state of destination will determine his rights as against bona fide purchasers of the
property. Denkins Motor Co. v. Humphreys, 310 Ky. 344, 220 S.W.
(2d) 847 (1949).
There is a minority doctrine to the effect that the filing or recording
of the conditional sales contract in the state where the property is
located and where the transaction took place does not protect the
conditional vendor against third persons after the removal of the
property to another state unless it is filed or recorded in the second
state. This minority rule is obviously applied where the state, by
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positive enactment in specific terms, declares that the conditional
vendor's lien executed in a foreign jurisdiction will not be recognized
unless it is re-recorded within the state to which the vehicle has been
removed. Miss. CODE AN. § 870 (1942). But it is also applied where
the court has merely interpretedthe local certificate of title act to mean
that the conditional vendor's lien must be re-recorded within the state
in order to be upheld against the claim of a bona fide purchaser. The
minority doctrine was adhered to in Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla.
481, 32 So. (2d) 7 (1947). The applicable section of Florida's certificate of title act, FLA. STAT. § 319.15 (1949), does not specifically state
that a conditional sales contract executed in another state and properly
recorded there must be re-recorded, but the court in the Lee case, supra,
interpreted its title act to mean just that.
Formerly, Texas and Louisiana supported the minority view, but
both presently construe their title acts in harmony with the majority
rule. General Motors Acceptance Corporationv. Nuss, 195 La. 209, 196
So. 323 (1940); Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W. (2d)
843 (1950). The Supreme Court of Texas in Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz,
supra, 226 S.W. (2d) at 849, discussed its certificate of title law saying:
The spirit and purpose of this law is to prevent fraud; not to encourage
it. It was not the intention of the Legislature by this Act to .invalidate
liens validly acquired in States which do not have a similar law. ...
If
the Legislature had intended this, it could have stated that all liens
acquired in other States not having certificate of title laws would be
forfeited when the vehicle reaches the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value in this State.

In view of the foregoing, in the State of Ohio, the question is simply
whether the court, in the cited case, interpreted its title act so as to
invalidate all foreign liens not re-recorded in Ohio, and thus join Florida
as a proponent of the minority view. Or can a conditional vendor in a
foreign jurisdiction as the plaintiff in Associates Discount Corp. v. Colonial Finance Co., supra, who has fully complied with the recording
statutes of his own jurisdiction, still prevail as against an innocent
purchaser in good faith in Ohio?
The court in the principal decision, 99 N.E. (2d) at 666, remarked
that:
The record does not disclose whether the conditional sale contract was
filed or recorded in any public office in California.

If the prevailing view had been applied, the Kelley Kar Company
would have had the burden of showing that the contract was registered
pursuant to the California statute. Since the statement quoted above
indicates that this burden was not sustained, it might appear at first
blush that the court actually did adopt and apply the majority rule.
In other words, it might be argued that the "instant decision is based
on the prevailing principle that where the conditional vendor does not
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comply with the recording statutes of his own jurisdiction, through
negligence or otherwise, he cannot successfully assert his claim as
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser in another jurisdiction. But
the court in effect said that, for the purpose of this decision, whether
or not the conditional vendor complied with the recording statutes of
his own jurisdiction was of no consequence and had no bearing on the
case. This contention is strengthened by the observation that the court,
99 N.E. (2d) at 670, favorably quoted from the Lee case, supra, a
decision supporting the minority view. Also the court said, 99 N.E. (2d)
at 670:
The General Assembly of the sovereign state of Ohio has declared the
The
policy of this state 'by enactment of the Certificate of Title Act ....
appellee [Kelley Kar Co.] has not complied with that law. The appellant
has complied with it. Therefore, -the appellee cannot prevail and procure
possession of the automobile in question. [Emphasis supplied.]
Consequently, even if the Kelley Kar Company had duly recorded
its lien pursuant to the recording statutes of California, unless it had
re-recorded its lien in Ohio it could not prevail there as against a
bona fide purchaser.
Without commenting on the soundness of this rule, it is the view
of this writer that a preferable solution would be for the legislature to
enact it by expressly providing that unless foreign liens are re-recorded
in Ohio they shall not prevail against innocent purchasers.
Edward Canary

RES IPSA LOQUITUR - ELECTRICAL SHOCK RECEIVED
TORTS FROm TELEPHONE. - Manley v. New York Tel. Co.. .... N. Y ..... ,100

N.E. (2d) 113 (1951). In an action to recover damages for a paralysis
of his right side, the plaintiff alleged that while removing a telephone
receiver, and as a result of the defendant's negligence, he received a
violent charge of electricity which knocked him down. The bill of
particulars charged specific acts of negligence which were not proved
at the trial. Ostensibly, the plaintiff primarily relied on his direct proof
rather than on res ipsa loquitur. The trial court non-suited him at the
close of his evidence, which consisted of his own inartistic testimony,
the statement of one lay witness that she found him on the floor with
the receiver hanging from the wall, and the opinion of a medical witness
that part of the plaintiff's present condition was due to trauma and
shock. The Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held that the
plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support an inference of
negligence under the res ipsa loquitur theory and thus affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
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Did the plaintiff satisfy the legal requirements necessary to support
an inference of negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine? More
specifically, should the uncertainty of the plaintiff's testimony, plus
the questionable medical proof, demolish the plaintiff's cause? This
was the issue on which the New York Court of Appeals was divided.
The origin of the doctrine is traced to Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C.
722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863), where a barrel of flour fell from a
warehouse window and injured a passer-by. The court held there was
sufficient prima facie evidence of negligence to cast on the defendant
the burden of going forward with the evidence to show that the accident
was not caused by his negligence. The use of the phrase and the application of the doctrine has grown rapidly in the United States. All jurisdictions have recognized and applied the principle except Michigan and
South Carolina. See Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So. CAL r. L. REv.
187 (1944).
The generally accepted requirements or conditions which must be
present before the doctrine may be invoked are: the accident must be
of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence; it must be caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant; and it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Mabee v. Sutliff & Case Co., 335 11. App. 353, 82 N.E. (2d) 63
(1948); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 206 Miss. 680, 40 So. (2d)
582 (1949); PROSSER, ToRTs § 43 (1941).
The procedural effect, according to the majority rule, is that the
doctrine is nothing more than one form of circumstantial evidence,
creating an inference of negligence which the jury in an ordinary case
will be permitted but not compelled to accept. New York cases exemplifying this rule are George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y.
108, 38 N.E. (2d) 455 (1941); Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196
N.E. 36 (1935); Slater v. Barnes, 241 N.Y. 284, 149 N.E. 859 (1925).
As in the instant case, a plaintiff frequently has alleged specific acts
of negligence in his pleadings, and then seeks to take advantage of the
res ipsa loquitur theory. There are two views in this regard. The strict
view does not allow the plaintiff to take advantage of the doctrine
after he has pleaded specific acts of negligence. Orr v. Des Moines
Electric Light Co., 213 Iowa 127, 238 N.W. 604 (1931); Bogrees v.
Wabash Ry., 266 S.W. 333 (Kan. City, Mo. Ct. of App. 1924). The
liberal and seemingly better view permits the plaintiff to take advantage
of the doctrine without regard to the form of the pleading. Gish v. Los
Angeles Ry., 13 Cal. (2d) 570, 90 P. (2d) 792 (1939); Firszt v.
Capitol Park Realty Co., 98 Conn. 627, 120 Atl. 300 (1923).
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine has been applied in cases dealing with
all kinds of human activity and therefore, the discussion here must be
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limited to those where it has been applied to factual situations similar
to that in the instant case.
In Shoemaker v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 17
F. Supp. 591 (D. Idaho 1937), res ipsa loquitur was held to be applicable where the plaintiff was injured by an electrical shock from a telephone receiver. The court said, 17 F. Supp. at 593:
It appears that the telephone system was under the charge of the
defendant, who installed it; that it was its duty to keep it up; and that
an injury occurred while plaintiff . . . was using the telephone in the
ordinary way. These facts bring the case under the rule advanced by the
plaintiffs, and under that rule it is not incumbent upon plaintiffs to set
out specifically the negligent acts or omissions complained of.

Two Missouri cases, Joyce v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., 211
S.W. 900 (Kan. City, Mo. Ct. of App. 1918) and Warren v. Missouri
& Kansas Telephone Co., 196 Mo. App. 549, 196 S.W. 1030 (Springfield Ct. of App. 1917), held that the res ipsa loquitur theory was
properly applied where the plaintiffs received electrical shocks while
using telephones in the ordinary and usual manner. A very recent
New York Supreme Court case, Hanaman v. New York Tel. Co., 278
App. Div. 875, 104 N.Y.S. (2d) 315 (3d Dep't 1951), held that a
res ipsa loquitur case arose where injury resulted from an electrical
shock sustained when using defendant's telephone.
The case most similar to the instant case on the facts is Cain v.
Southern Massachusetts Telephone Co., 219 Mass. 504, 107 N.E. 380
(1914). A crank type telephone and equivocal medical testimony appeared in both. The plaintiff also alleged specific acts of negligence and
then relied on res ipsa loquitur. The highest tribunal of Massachusetts
held this to be proper and ruled that it was error for the trial court
to grant a non-suit. In Fox v. Keystone Telephone Co., 326 Pa. 420, 192
AtI. 116 (1937), impairment to the plaintiff was again caused by an
electrical charge delivered through the receiver. Specific acts of negligence were pleaded and recovery allowed. Perhaps the leading case
in this series is Delahunt v. United Telephone & Telegraph Co., 215
Pa. 241, 64 Atl. 515 (1906), where the doctrine was applied against
the telephone company requiring it to show that the death of the
plaintiff's decedent was not caused by an electrical shock from the
telephone. The court, conceding that the current in a telephone may
not ordinarily be a dangerous one, nevertheless held that since a telephone company should know that its lines might conduct a deadly
charge, it must provide against this possibility by constant supervision
of its installations and wires.
In the light of the consideration of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
in the above telephone cases, did the plaintiff in the instant case state
a case which should have escaped a non-suit? Certainly the instrumentality was in the control of the defendant, that is, the maintenance
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of the telephone was the responsibility of the telephone company. It
cannot be said that such an accident ordinarily occurs without negligence. Delahunt v. United Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra. There
being no proof that the plaintiff's clothes were wet, or that the floor
was wet where he stood, it must be concluded that the plaintiff was
free from contributory negligence. It is the conclusion of the writer
that the dissenting opinion in the instant case properly stated the law;
that is, that the prima facie case should not be destroyed by inartistic
pleadings and testimony.
Maynard R. Bissonnette

TRADE REGULATION FAiR TRADE AcTs - EFFECT OF NONSIGNER. CLAUSE ON FAIn TRADE CONTRACTS. - Schwegmann Bros. v.

Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L. Ed. 1035
(1951). The respondents, distributors of gin and whiskey, had a price-

fixing policy whereby they endeavored to make retailers contract to
sell their product at no less than the minimum price established by

the company schedules. At the time of this suit, there were over 100
similar contracts in effect in Louisiana. The petitioner, a retail dealer
of the respondents' products, refused to sign the contract and, with
full knowledge of its terms and in violation of it, sold the products for
less than the established minimum price. The respondents obtained a
preliminary injunction in the district court which was upheld by the
circuit court. Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 184 F.
(2d) 11 (5th Cir. 1950). The present action came before the Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari.
The principal issue presented to the Court was whether, under the
Miller-Tydings amendment and the Louisiana Fair Trade Act, a nonsigner of a price-fixing contract in an interstate price-fixing scheme
could be enjoined from selling at less than the minimum price stipulated
by the company and effective under the contract.
The Court, with three justices dissenting and two affirming specially,
reversed the decree, holding that the Miller-Tydings amendment permitted vertical price-fixing only where sanctioned by state law and
agreed to by the parties. But to enforce the contract terms against one
not in privity, it was held, would be to condone price-fixing by compulsion, a consequence not within the intent of Congress at the time
of passage of the amendment.
Under the Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 et seq. (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1
et seq. (1946), the fixing of minimum prices is illegal per se. United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811, 84
L. Ed. 1129 (1940). Similarly, a resale price maintenance contract is
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invalid without congressional approval. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911).
However, the Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act, 50 STAT.
693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946), provided that "nothing herein
contained shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing
minimum prices for the resale" of commodities which bear the trade
mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor when the "contracts or agreements of that description are lawful" according to the
law of the state.
In addition to permitting contracts establishing minimum prices, the
law of Louisiana (where the instant case arose) also provides that once
a contract of this kind is made with any retailer in the state, it is unfair
competition for any other retailer, acting with knowledge of the facts,
to sell for less than the minimum price. 51 LA. STAT. ANN. - REv.
STAT. § 391 (1950). In.other words, the Louisiana statute also enforces
price fixing against non-signers of the contracts.
In Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation
Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640, 648 (1936), the
author pointed out that fair trade legislation had its first general
impetus following the depression and was aimed principally at economic
control. The first of these acts was enacted in California but it received
little use. One reason was, as Grether, supra at 660, pointed out, the
lack of control over dealers who refused to sign the contract. Later, the
act was amended to include non-signers who acted with knowledge of
the pricing contracts. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16904 (1937). The
purpose was "to introduce the coercive element essential to any large
scale attempt to employ the Act." Grether, supra, at 644. At the present
time this clause, in one form or another, is in most of the state fair
trade acts. Even where it did not appear that the statute expressly so
provided, it has been held that an action would lie against one who
was not a party to the fair trade agreement. Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. (2d) 176 (1939). This clause forms the
principal basis around which the present controversy revolves.
The coercive effect injected into the fair trade acts by the nonsigner clause and said to be so essential to their effectiveness was held
to be reason for reversal in the principal case, the reasoning being that
if the Miller-Tydings amendment legalized "contracts or agreements,"
then an essential element would be consensual agreement. This is not
always found to be the case. In Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of
Olympia, 10 Wash. (2d) 372, 116 P. (2d) 756 (1941), the court said
that voluntary acquisition of the commodity with knowledge of the
restrictions indicated assent to the retail price. Lentheric, Inc. v. Weissbard, 122 N.J. Eq. 573, 195 Atl. 818 (1937). Weco Products Co. v.
Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937). In Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549, 556 (E.D.S.C. 1939), the
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court even went so far as to say that contract law was not applicable
to enforcement against non-signers for a statutory right, not a contract
right, was asserted.
The non-signer clause has also undergone attack in the courts on
the question of constitutionality. In Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v.
Seagram Distillery Co., 299 U.S. 183, 57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L. Ed. 109
(1936), decided before the passage of the Miller-Tydings amendment,
the facts were remarkably similar to the facts of the principal case.
The defendant, a liquor retailer, sold products of the complainant at a
cut price yet at a profit to himself. From an injunction restraining him
from selling below the price set by contract with other retailers, the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending, inter alia, that
the non-signer clause of the act constituted a denial of due process
and equal protection of the laws. However, the court upheld the
validity of the Fair Trade Act of Illinois, and answered these objections
by drawing a distinction between the goodwill symbolized by the
trademark and the property right in the article itself.
A second objection to the acts themselves is that they constitute
legislative price fixing of goods not affected with a public interest.
Under this objection, a court stated, Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy,
269 N.Y. 272, 199 N.E. 409, 411 (1936), "What the legislature cannot
do directly it cannot do indirectly," and held the act to be unconstitutional. In the following year, however, this court, the New York Court
of Appeals overruled itself in Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273
N.Y. 167, 7 N.E. (2d) 30 (1937), in deference to the Supreme Court
decision in the Old Dearborncase, supra. In Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc.,
106 Utah 156, 146 P. (2d) 203 (1944), the court similarly dispensed
with this objection by stating that the fair trade acts were never
designed to permit the regulation and control of prices for which the
manufacturer or producer could sell his product nor do they attempt
to establish prices. They merely permit the manufacturer to enter into
resale price agreements with dealers to protect the goodwill of the
product. Kunsman v. Max Factor& Co., 299 U.S. 198, 57 S.Ct. 147,
81 L. Ed. 122 (1936); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559,
2 N.E. (2d) 929, aff'd, 299 U.S. 183, 57 S. Ct. 139, 81 L. Ed. 109
(1936); California Oil Co. v. Reingold, 5 N.J. Super. 525, 68 A. (2d)
572, 573 (1949), holding: "That the enactment of the Fair Trade Act
...was within the authority of the legislature is no longer open to
question."
Conspicuous by its absence is any direct authority sustaining the
opinion of the Court in the principal case. The determination was based
principally'upon an interpretation of legislative intent; the conclusion
was that Congress, by omitting a non-signer provision, intended to make
only "contracts or agreements" lawful and not to force contractual
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terms upon retailers who did not agree to them regardless of the nonsigner provisions of state statutes. 71 S. Ct. at 750-1. This interpretation is not unreasonable in the light of Rayess v. Lane Drug Co., 138
Ohio St. 401, 35 N.E. (2d) 447 (1941), which held that the fair trade
laws are authorized exceptions to the general rule forbidding restraints
of trade and must be strictly construed. Mennen Co. v. Krauss Co., 37
F. Supp. "161 (E.D. La. 1941). But it should not be given such a narrow
and strict judicial construction as virtually to destroy its purpose.
Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., 166 Misc. 342,
2 N.Y.S. (2d) 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
In Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922, (E.D. La. 1944),
the court interpreted the legislative intent quite differently than did
the Court in the instant case and arrived at a directly opposite conclusion. In granting the injunction the court stated, 56 F. Supp. at 927:
The history of the legislation leaves no doubt that Congress enacted
the Miller-Tydings amendment with full knowledge of the provisions in
state fair trade acts making resale price maintenance effective against

non-contracting retailers, and that it was the design and intention of
Congress to remove every obstacle which would hinder the free enforcement by the states of the provisions of their local fair trade acts in such

fashion as their respective legislatures saw fit.

It is interesting to note that in arriving at these opposite interpretations of intent, the court in the Pepsodent case relied upon substantially
the same sources as those used in the principal case.
While the basic principle is not specifically covered in the MillerTydings Act, numerous cases have been successfully pressed on the
ground that Congress intended the statute to support the non-signer
clause. Sunbeam Corporation v. Wentling, 91 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa.),
decree modified to apply to intrastate sales only, 185 F. (2d) 905 (3d
Cir. 1950); Schill v. Remington Putnam Book Co., 179 Md. 83, 17 A.
(2d) 175 (1941); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., supra; Calvert
Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc., supra; Weco Products
Co. v. Reed Drug Co., supra.
The effect of the instant decision is to render inadequate the power
of the state to accomplish the purpose of fair trade legislation. If the
property interest of trademark owners is to remain a proper subject
for legislative protection, the Miller-Tydings amendment must be
broadened to include the relevant provisions of the state acts. Until
that is done, the Sherman Act will render nugatory the non-signer
clauses which make these state fair trade acts truly effective.
Luke R. Morin

